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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3177 
___________ 
 
JAMIE ELLIOTT, 
                       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LT. GRACE; SGT. WEAVERLING;  
C.O.I. HARMER; C.O.I. CULP;  
C.O.I. MORRIS; C.O.I. PARK;  
C.O.I. POLLECK; C.O.I. TELLER;   
C.O.I. ROSS; C.O. III COUCH; 
C.O. II HARPER; C.O. II COOPER;  
C.O. II HAMMER  
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-89-cv-01553) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 20, 2018 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., BIBAS and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 28, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 In 1989, Jamie Elliott filed a prisoner civil rights complaint against defendants.  In 
1993, the District Court entered judgment against him after a jury trial.  In 1999, Elliott 
filed an appeal from the judgment which we dismissed as untimely.  See C.A. No. 99-
3790.  Since then, he has continued to file motions in the District Court case.  In July 
2017, Elliott filed motions for a new trial, default judgment, and appointment of counsel.  
The District Court denied his motions, and Elliott filed a notice of appeal.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 A motion for a new trial filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 must be filed within 
twenty-eight days after entry of the judgment.  Elliott’s motion for a new trial was filed 
far beyond that time period, and in any event, Elliott did not set forth any reasons or legal 
basis for reopening the judgment. 
 Even if the motion were to be construed as a timely motion to reopen the judgment 
filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), it would fail.1  Rule 60(b)(6) permits a litigant 
to move for relief from judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief.”  A litigant 
moving under Rule 60(b)(6) must show “extraordinary circumstances” to justify 
reopening a final judgment.  Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005).  We review 
the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion.  Jackson v. Danberg, 656 
F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2011). 
                                              
1 A motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) must be made within a reasonable time.  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). 
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 Elliott did not present any extraordinary reasons why the jury verdict from 1993 
should be reopened.  He simply noted that he is disabled and that his brother had been at 
SCI Huntingdon.  He requested a new trial on his claims of wrongful death, assault, and 
battery.  In his supplemental argument in support of the appeal, he appears to claim that 
one defendant attacked him, and that after he filed a lawsuit, the defendants purportedly 
retaliated by “playing” with his brother’s medications, causing his brother to have a heart 
attack.  Elliott also appears to allege that defendants put something in his food that caused 
him chest pains.  However, he does not explain why these allegations would be grounds 
to reopen a judgment entered after a jury verdict over twenty years ago.   
 Elliott also argued in the District Court that he was entitled to a default judgment 
because the defendants did not respond to his motion for a new trial.  He does not point to 
any caselaw, rule, or statute that allows for a default judgment twenty years after a jury 
verdict.  The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Elliott’s motion for a 
default judgment.  See Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(reviewing denial of motion for default for an abuse of discretion). 
 Because Elliott’s post-judgment motions lacked merit, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying his motion for the appointment of counsel.  See Tabron v. 
Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993) (in deciding whether to appoint counsel, court must 
make threshold determination of whether claim has arguable merit). 
 As explained above, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying any 
of Elliott’s motions.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
Appellant’s motions are denied.  
